Chapter 13

Catholic Censorship of Early Modern Psychology

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During the first centuries of the Christian Era the need for an ‘orthodox’ psychology arose when early Christian authors engaged with contemporary philosophical culture. It became a crucial issue in the battle against Gnostic heresies and then, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in the controversy over Averroism after the spread of Aristotelian philosophy in the West. In the Renaissance, the Catholic Church was pressed to tackle still more challenges, not only the non-religious, ‘philosophical’ interpretations of Aristotle’s works by Italian philosophers, but also several views on the origin of the human soul that were formulated as more or less explicit alternatives to Peripatetic and scholastic psychology.

This chapter presents an outline of the Catholic censorship of psychological views during the period between the rise of the Roman Congregations of the Inquisition (1543) and of the Index (1572), and the first prohibitions of modern philosophy in the second half of the seventeenth century. I concentrate on philosophical and scientific works and views; theological treatises and ideas, concerning, for example, the ‘state’ of the separate soul or the beatific vision of God, are not taken into consideration. Furthermore, views and works that attracted the attention of the afore-mentioned Roman ecclesiastical bodies of doctrinal control are discussed.

Psychology was one of the very few disciplinary areas of natural philosophy where orthodoxy could be judged on the basis of formal juridical grounds. In effect, the General Council of Vienne (1311–12) had established, in the Decretal Fidei catholicae fundamenta, the Catholic doctrine against three points of Peter Olivi’s teachings, among which was the question of the way the soul is united with the body. Subsequently, the papal Bull Apostolici Regiminis, which referred to Averroist and Alexandrist psychology, and the eternity of the world (issued on 19 December 1513 during the Fifth Lateran Council), obliged university professors to correct and thoroughly refute any suspect or heretical philosophical views. Nonetheless, in the examination of philosophy and science, Catholic censorship suffered from a general lack of formal criteria to label and evaluate possibly heterodox views. In general, the intimate link between Aristotelian natural philosophy, metaphysics, and (natural) theology made non-Aristotelian views suspect and easily turned any criticism of Aristotelian philosophy into an implicit attack on the logical possibility of the truths of faith and into a threat to the unity of the scholastic edifice of
learning and culture. This nexus entailed first of all strenuous opposition against heterodox Aristotelian views, but it also affected sixteenth-century versions of Platonism (Patrizi), as well as forms of naturalism (Pomponazzi, Cardano, Bruno), and of materialism (Telesio).

Psychological heterodoxy was also analysed in inquisitorial manuals. Discussing the errors made by philosophers in his *Directorium inquisitorum* (edited by Francisco Peña in 1578), Nicolas Eymerich devoted a large section to psychological deviations, censuring in particular Arabic noetics and the doctrine of metempsychosis. Alfonso de Castro, author of *Adversus omnes haereses* (first edition: Paris 1534) and *De iusta haereticorum punitione* (first edition: Salamanca 1547), listed nine forms of deviation in matters psychological: the negation of the ‘anima forma corporis’ [soul as the form of the body] view, the identification of the ‘spiraculum quod Deus spiravit in Adam’ [the breath of life that God breathed into Adam] (Genesis 2. 7) with the soul, the creation of the soul before the body, the divine nature of the soul, the negation of the creation of the soul by God, the transmigration of vicious souls into demons, the mortality of the soul, the transmigration of the soul from one body to another, and the incarnation of the soul in the body as punishment for sins committed before the infusion.

The first two sections of what follows present a cursory overview of psychological orthodoxy in the Ancient Church and Middle Ages, and of the challenges posed by early modern philosophy and science. The third section analyses some case studies, while section four considers institutional aspects, in particular the effects of censorship.

1. The genesis of orthodox psychology

In early Christianity, the issue of orthodox psychology came to the fore in the engagement with contemporary pagan culture. In particular, with the rise of the first heresies, the origin, nature and destiny of the human soul, as well as its relation to the body, and the transmission of original sin became crucial questions. From the outset, the basic problem in any Christian psychology was its scriptural justification. The Bible provides scant guidance on these matters, and the New Testament apparently contradicts the Old Testament. The Gospels and the Epistles of Paul stress the salvation of the human soul, while it is not evident that the Old Testament throughout either asserts or implies the distinct reality of the soul. As a consequence, Christian psychology was largely dependent upon extra-biblical sources, in particular on ancient medical and philosophical views.

Since on the one hand pagan philosophers were inclined to attack the Church and its doctrines, while on the other hand Christian apologists and theologians frequently borrowed the weapons of their adversaries when they thought that these weapons could serve their purpose, it is only to be expected that Christian writers would show a divergence of attitude in regard to ancient philosophy.

In his treatise *De anima*, Tertullian (c. 160–c. 220 CE) aims to show the failure of all philosophies to elucidate the nature of the soul, and argues eloquently that Christ alone can teach mankind the truth on such subjects. In particular he attacks Platonic and Gnostic heresies. In Tertullian’s view, the very notion of an immaterial
Substance is a non-sense, for ‘spirit is a body of a special kind’. His own doctrine is a form of Stoic materialism, supported by arguments from medicine and physiology and by interpretations of Scripture. The soul is created, defined as ‘flatus factus ex spiritu Dei’ [breath created from the spirit of God]. It is both immortal and corporeal, and arises together with the body.

Origen (c. 185–254 CE) taught the pre-existence of the soul. During the six days of the creation of the world, God created a sufficient number of souls for the entirety of mankind: ‘ut tantae sint, quantae a providentia Dei et dispensari et regi et contineri possint’ [that they are as many as can be dispensed, ruled and contained by God’s providence]. Terrestrial life is a punishment and a remedy for prenatal sin. The ‘soul’ properly speaking is degraded spirit: the flesh is a condition of alienation and bondage. The spirit, however, finite spirit, can exist only in a body, albeit of a glorious and ethereal nature. Origen’s doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul was condemned by an edict of Justinian in 543, and at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553.

In general, Augustine (354–430 CE) upholds the opposition of body and soul, but against the Manichaeans he asserts the worth and dignity of the body. For Augustine, it is virtually axiomatic that the human soul is both immaterial and immortal. Yet, he most probably regarded the origin of the soul as perhaps beyond our ken, as he never definitely decided between traducianism and creationism. Augustine is important for the centuries to come, not only for his ‘positive’ psychological views, but maybe even more for his attempts to draw distinctions between orthodox and heterodox views in matters psychological.

In general terms, during the Patristic period the anthropological and psychological conceptions of the Bible were developed into a view that body and soul in man were in a relation of apposition. After the discovery of Aristotelian philosophy, this view was transformed into the Scholastic doctrine of the essential composition of soul and body.

The twelfth- and thirteenth-century translations of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes provided new paradigms for philosophical psychology, paradigms that were significantly different from those originating with Augustine or Boethius. Early thirteenth-century psychology was heavily influenced by Avicenna, whose De anima blurred the linguistic and conceptual contrasts between Peripatetic and Neoplatonic psychologies. Averroes’s position on the material intellect is essentially different from those of earlier commentators. Following Alexander and Avempace in his early works, he started off with a material intellect that is a disposition or preparation of the corporeal forms (not of the body, as Alexander held) and concluded in the Long Commentary on the De anima, where both Alexander and Avempace are refuted, with the view of the material intellect as an eternal, unique substance that joins man from without.

The theories of Averroes became known in Catholic Europe during the first decades of the thirteenth century, but they were not immediately understood. In 1256 Pope Alexander IV instructed Albert the Great to investigate Averroes’s teaching on the unity of the intellect. In Paris, Siger of Brabant expounded Averroist theories which were attacked by Thomas Aquinas, and in 1270 Etienne Tempier,
Bishop of Paris, condemned several errors arising from Averroist teaching. After 1277, Averroism ceased to be taught in the University of Paris, though it returned again in the fourteenth century and survived in Italy until the Renaissance.

2. The challenge from alternative interpretations and views: Pietro Pomponazzi to Antonio Rocco

In the second half of the fifteenth century many previously unknown classical philosophical works were discovered, translated and published, mainly works by (neo-) Platonic and Hellenistic writers. This rediscovery had its effect on the interpretation of Peripatetic philosophy, as numerous non-Aristotelian doctrines and views found their way into commentaries on Aristotle. During the same period, the invention of printing made the Greek Aristotle available to a large audience of scholars. New philological tools and techniques were developed for interpreting the ancient texts. At the same time, philosophers at northern Italian universities came to highlight the differences between Aristotelian philosophy of mind and theological psychology, as is clear from the controversy about the immortality of the human soul, which developed at the University of Padua.

Psychological speculation during the Italian Renaissance was strongly influenced by the conceptions of past masters. The works of Averroes, Siger of Brabant, and those of John of Jandun and his school weighed heavily on the northern Italian disputes. Most singular in this respect was the position of Averroes. For example, Alessandro Achillini believed that Averroes had given the only genuine interpretation of Aristotle; at the same time, however, he refused to accept his interpretation because it was incompatible with Catholic faith. A major interruption in the history of psychological discussions at Padua was caused by the controversy over the immortality of the human soul, which led to the episcopal and papal condemnations of such heterodox views in 1489 and 1513. These pronouncements did not succeed in restraining philosophical debate altogether, but they did lead to significant changes in the philosophical outlook of many writers. Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Niño, for example, publicly denounced their earlier view that Averroes was the most authoritative interpreter of Aristotle’s psychology. This did not mean that they gave up all (allegedly) Averroistic doctrines.

Already in 1510, Caietanus (Thomas Cajetan) stated in his commentary on the *De anima* that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated with philosophical arguments derived from Aristotle. He proposed instead a demonstration based on Platonic views. The debate following the publication of Pomponazzi’s *De immortalitate animae* in 1516 led other authors to a more profound reconsideration of the intrinsic value of Aristotle’s philosophy. Crisostomo Javelli, for example, although certainly not adhering to any form of anti-Aristotelianism, came to the conclusion that Aristotle and philosophy were no longer one and the same.

Pomponazzi argued that according to Aristotle’s texts, the human intellect depends on the body for its operation; thus, it is mortal, or else only immortal ‘secundum quid’ [in a certain respect]. This position was also endorsed by Girolamo Borri and, as we shall see, by Cesare Cremonini. Therefore, it was quite natural that the discussion of doctrinal deviation in psychology became a central item in many
inquisitorial manuals,\textsuperscript{24} and that it was duly recognized in the ecclesiastical \textit{censurae} of the works by Francesco Giorgio and Girolamo Cardano.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, in the decades following the Council of Trent, the Church vigorously opposed views suggesting a distinction between biblical and philosophical truth.\textsuperscript{26}

One strand in Protestant thinking denied the soul’s natural immortality, claiming that, according to the Scriptures, the whole individual dies, to be resurrected only at the Last Judgment.\textsuperscript{27} However, this position mainly occurred in discussions in Northern Europe, and from the extant documentation it can be deduced that it did not play a role in the proceedings of the Italian bodies of doctrinal control.

Another kind of challenge to orthodox Peripatetic psychology developed in the first half of the seventeenth–century and was linked to a physiological view of the origin of the human soul. Daniel Sennert and Domenico Beccoli argued, with different claims, for a new form of traducianism, while Antonio Rocco defended the immortality of the soul \textit{cum} traducianism.

3. The censorship of early modern philosophical psychology

Early modern psychological heterodoxy was multifaceted and developed on different levels, and thus must be classified under several labels. The extant files of the Roman Inquisition offer a wide range of individual cases, a sample of which can be of some help in establishing a provisional classification:

(1) in 1571 a local Calabrian inquisitor informs Scipione Rebiba, dean of the Roman Holy Office, about an ex-priest that he had arrested, because he held the view that the human soul was composed of air, water and fire.\textsuperscript{28}

(2) in 1607 the Inquisitor of Aquileia writes to the central office in Rome about the circulation of manuscript copies of works by Pietro Pomponazzi and Giulio Castellani.

(3) in 1610 the Inquisitor of Ferrara denies the \textit{imprimatur} to a work on the immortality of the soul.

(4) between 1598 and 1627 the Roman Inquisition takes action, without success, against Cesare Cremonini’s strictly ‘philosophical’ interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology, which involved believing in the mortality of the human soul.

(5) in the 1640s the Inquisition proceeds against a view held by Domenico Beccoli and a work by Antonio Rocco, because they suggested or openly entertained a physiological origin for the soul.

(6) in 1660, Tommaso Cornelio’s view of the soul was associated with atheism.

Thus psychological heterodoxy emerged in speech, treatises and commentaries, and in the reading of forbidden or suspect books and manuscripts. In this section, I will concentrate on the examination of written works by the Inquisition and the Index, in particular the \textit{censurae} of Juan Huarte’s \textit{Examen de ingenios} and of the works and views held by Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno and Francesco Giorgio, the proceedings against and/or concerning some commentaries on \textit{De anima}
(Jacopo Zabarella, Johann Havenreuter, and Cesare Cremonini), and, finally, the condemnation of Daniel Sennert, Domenico Beccoli, and Antonio Rocco.

3.1. Huarte’s *Examen de ingenios*

Juan Huarte (c. 1530–1592) was a Spanish physician and psychologist. His *Examen de ingenios para las ciencias* (first edition: 1575), though based on the medicine of Galen, was one of the first early modern attempts to show the connection between psychology and physiology. It was prohibited and/or corrected in the Indexes of Portugal (1581) and Spain (1583, 1584). It was also placed on the Roman Indexes of 1590 and 1593, which were not promulgated, although it was not mentioned in Clement VIII’s Index of 1596.29 In 1587 it was examined by Robert Bellarmine, then consultor of the Index. 30 Bellarmine challenged the naturalist explanation of supernatural or particular phenomena, such as prophecy and the (instantaneous) knowledge of foreign languages. He also criticized Huarte’s view that intelligence was an organic faculty, dependent upon a cold and dry temperament. Bellarmine considered issuing a conditional prohibition (that is, with the stipulation that it should not be published ‘donec corrigitur’ [until it is corrected]), but eventually proposed a total ban, because: (1) the passages to be corrected were too many; (2) the book propagated wrong philosophical views (for example, the view of a common instinct in all animals, based on primary qualities); (3) the pedagogical proposals for the education of children were both mean and obscene; and (4) the idea of intelligence as an organic faculty entailed the mortality of the soul.

3.2. Psychology inspired by Neoplatonism

A short note entitled *Sententia spiritus universi*, kept in the Archive of the Index, represents a most illuminating sample of late sixteenth–century Catholic censorship of Neoplatonically inspired psychology.31 This concise document synthesizes in seven points the psychological doctrine of the *spiritus universi*, formulates a *censura* centered upon the incompatibility of this conception with the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation, and concludes with a *Responsio ad argumentum*, that is, a reply formulated by the author under accusation. Referring to the well-known Virgilian passage beginning ‘spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus’ [an inner spirit nourishes things from within and a mind is infused throughout its limbs] (*Aeneid*, vi. 726–51), the anonymous author develops the view of a universal soul existing ‘in toto, et in qualibet parte hujus universi’. This universal principle is also present in men, although subordinated to the rational soul. As a consequence, all things that are ‘rationalitatis expertes’ [endowed with rationality] can be distinguished only by accidental differences.

The view of a single soul as the origin of all other souls and of the existence of a world soul as a principle of motion is entertained by several Neoplatonic philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, including Marsilio Ficino, Francesco Giorgio, Francesco Patrizi and Giordano Bruno. Censorship of Patrizi’s and Giorgio’s psychological views is extensively documented in ACDF.

José Esteve, author of the first examination of Giorgio’s *In Sacram Scripturam*
Problemata (first edition: Venice, 1536), but written after the 1574 Paris edition, traced in some passages a clear tendency to interpret the creation of human souls in terms of a ‘productio’ [production], which could be viewed as a ‘seminis traductio’ [transfer of seed]. Consequently, Esteve proposed the suppression of the entire section where Giorgio entertained the idea of the infusion of the individual souls by God, because that implicitly denied their creation in time. The Pisan professor Giacomo Tavanti also analysed Giorgio’s psychological views in some detail. He condemned the idea of the creation of the soul before the creation of the body, and referring to earlier criticisms formulated by Sixtus of Siena in his Bibliotheca Sancta (1566), Tavanti established a conceptual link with Origen’s heresy. Thus, he challenged a passage where the introduction of the soul into the body is discussed, because Giorgio ‘omitted’ to qualify the former explicitly as ‘hominis forma’ [the form of man]. Central to his attack on Giorgio’s psychology was the latter’s interpretation of a famous passage in Genesis, which excluded the notion of any divine act of creation after the work of six days. Thus he vigorously rejected the creation of all souls in one unique act. The creation of the souls ‘ante corpora’ [before bodies] was also condemned in an anonymous censura, which mentioned not only Origen, but also Pythagoras. Another anonymous censor censured Giorgio’s stress on the creation of ‘omnia simul’ [everything at once], as this seriously compromised the idea of the creation of human souls in time.

In his censura of Patrizi’s Nova philosophia, Juan Pedro Saragozza condemned the animation of the heavens and the alleged presence of an intellect in animals. He summarised the errors in Patrizi’s psychology under six topics, paying particular attention to the agent intellect as a mediation between God and the individual rational souls, and to the pre-existence of the soul. On the basis of Alfonso de Castro’s treatise on heresy, he qualified these views as absurd errors.

Benedetto Giustiniani, a remarkably benevolent censor of Patrizi’s work, stated that the latter entertained the idea of the animation of the heavens. Yet he did not classify it as an erroneous view, but rather as a purely philosophical doctrine of Platonic origin. He qualified the creation of human souls through the mediation of the divine mind, and the existence of a unique primordial soul as inappropriate (‘impropria’), but he did not consider these views as false (‘non tamen aberrat à vero’). Giustiniani condemned the books on mystical philosophy, where he traced the error of Origen, but he held that the author was well aware that it was a false doctrine.

In his replies to the censurae, Patrizi defended his psychological views under attack, in particular the unity of all souls and the animation of the celestial bodies. In the Roman redaction of his Declarationes (1594), he argues that in the third book of the Panpsychia, where he viewed the world soul as the unique origin of all souls, he intended material souls only, that is vegetative and animal souls. This was explicitly confirmed in the Emendatio (1592). However, this specification is neither to be found in the Nova philosophia, nor in his notes for an emended edition contained in a codex in Parma. Thus, the ‘praeter humanum’ [except for the human] of the Emendatio appears to be just a pious correction.

The censurae of the psychologies of Giorgio and Patrizi reveal some characteristics of
the ecclesiastical censorship of heterodox psychologies. Giorgio’s and Patrizi’s works were not totally banned, but placed on the Index with the temporary stipulation ‘donec corrigatur’. Indeed, Rule VIII of the Tridentine Index had introduced expurgation, which concerned those heretical or suspect statements in books which occurred occasionally (*obiter*), and this suggested that they could be easily isolated. And indeed, as long as only names or clearly distinct passages were to be eliminated, things were relatively simple. The situation became quite complicated when the book was placed on the Index because the author put forth views in open or veiled conflict with Catholic doctrine, and in particular when the censor had to tackle erroneous propositions that were intimately rooted in complex theoretical systems. Indeed Giorgio’s and Patrizi’s works did not directly contradict Catholic doctrine, but they certainly contained many potentially pernicious views.

In the case of Giordano Bruno, little is known about the charges that concerned his psychology, but the passages about the universal spirit in the summary of his trial reveal that his censors discussed his psychological views. However, as in the *censurae* of Giorgio and Patrizi, they did not explicitly reject his psychological universalism, but rather his deviation from the canonical definition of the soul as a form of the body, that is, his entertaining the Platonic view of the soul as ‘nauta navis’ [the helmsman of the ship].

It should be borne in mind that not even in the manuals of Eymerich and de Castro was the universal soul counted among the psychological deviations. Therefore, the aforementioned *Sententia spiritus universi* presents a new aspect of the conceptual framework underlying the ecclesiastical censorship of Renaissance psychology. It did not formulate a generic condemnation of the position under attack, but it shows that a universalist psychology contradicts a central dogma of the church, thus revealing explicitly the dangerous potential of such a conceptual structure.

### 3.3. Commentaries and views on Aristotle’s *De anima*

In 1601 the heirs of Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589) asked the Congregation of the Index for permission to publish his *De anima* commentary. On 21 June the Congregation commissioned an examination of the work from Alfonso Soto, professor of theology in the University of Padua, and in a letter of 28 July, Agostino Valier, dean of the Congregation, asked Soto to pay particular attention to the passages where Zabarella proved with Aristotle the mortality of the soul:

> My illustrious Lords of the Congregation of the Index seriously consider you in your proper worth by commissioning from you the assessment of Zabarella’s commentaries on the soul, and especially those passages where with Aristotle he proves the mortality of the soul. And you should attempt to adjust these in such a way that they not only put forth the truth which one must accept through faith and with good philosophy, but you should refute and dissolve these very arguments, which he takes from Aristotle’s text. All these adjusted passages you should send in a note in order that, once these are approved, the book can be licensed for the press.

Soto, however, although grateful to the Congregation for their trust, was convinced...
that this task was beyond his capabilities, as it would require an almost complete rewriting of Zabarella’s work. And thus he proposed on 25 August simply to add to the edition a short list of views to be corrected:

And thus I infinitely do thank Your Illustrious Lordship together with all the illustrious gentlemen, your colleagues and my lords, that they have a good opinion of me, in having judged me suitable for this work. But in truth, I find many difficulties, both for my part and for that of the heirs of Zabarella. For my part, because not only am I asked to see the passages that are contrary to the truth and good philosophy, but I am presumed to prove the immortality from those very passages that he [sc. Zabarella] uses to demonstrate the mortality [of the soul], by refuting and solving his arguments. This is an immense effort, considering that I have abandoned now for many years intensive research and fresh study of philosophical problems, as I have been occupied in the issues of my profession, as befits old age. Indeed, I am now sixty-seven years old. In addition, this work which points at highlighting issues, requires a free person and not one constrained as I am. From the point of view of Zabarella’s heirs, there is a difficulty, because they would like to see the commentaries of their father in print, and not mine. Because if things were done as your Illustrious Lordship commands, then my commentaries will be needed, rather than those of Zabarella, as his entire work would have to be turned upside down, providing different interpretations, using different reasonings, and laying down different bases. But if the job consisted of noting only the places repugnant to the truth, this is something that could be done by many persons, and Zabarella’s heirs would be satisfied with it, as long as the interpretation and order of the text are not altered.45

On 29 September Agostino Valier asked the Venetian Inquisitor for further information,46 but most probably no further proceedings developed. The work was published in 1606 by the well-known Frankfurt publisher Lazarus Zetzner and subsequently it was not prohibited in any known Index.

In 1612, another *De anima* commentary, written by Johann Havenreuter (1548–1618) and published in 1605,47 drew the attention of the Index. On 24 January a first examination was commissioned from the Regular Cleric Raffaele Rastelli, who presented his *censura* after only four days.48 In a succinct note Rastelli stated that this commentary contained propositions that ‘smelled’ of paganism, and that it attributed views about God to Aristotle that he actually never held. Next, he highlighted the fact that Havenreuter entertained the view that the human mind is potentially contained in the male seed, which he proved with Aristotle’s works, rational arguments, and passages from Holy Scripture, thus implicitly contradicting Thomas Aquinas and his commentator Cajetan.49 At the end of 1612, this commentary was also reviewed by Blasio Aloisio, who again challenged the idea of the origin of the rational soul from matter, and who defined this view as the heresy of the ‘Luciferiani’, also held by Tertullian and Apollinaris, as testified by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.50 Finally, after eight years, the *censura* of the book was commissioned from Stefano del Bufalo, who was also involved in the case against Cremonini, but his examination is not preserved in the archive of the Index.51

An Inquisition decree of 1598 attests the start of proceedings against Cesare Cremonini (1550–1631), a famous Paduan professor, focusing upon his heterodox inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s psychological texts ‘ad mentem Alexandri Afrodisei’ [according to the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias]. In the following century, the investigations also involved his interpretation of Aristotle’s cosmology.

On 13 May 1604 the Roman Holy Office discussed Camillo Belloni’s accusation against Cremonini. From the following documents it can be deduced that one of the main charges against Cremonini concerned his ‘philosophical’ interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology. And a couple of years later, the Inquisition discovered that Cremonini’s students were spreading to other towns in Italy:

The letters of the Inquisitor at Aquileia, dated Udine 14 May, were read; he points out that at the house of a physician in Venzoni many manuscripts had been discovered containing works against the immortality of the soul written by Pomponazzi, Castellani, and others, which he asserts were published in Padua by Paolo Meietii bookseller. And he further informs us that the disciples of doctor Cremonini eagerly disseminate this opinion. Whereupon the most illustrious Lords ordained to reply to the Inquisitor that he should carefully interrogate the afore-named physician, from whom, and when he purchased the above-mentioned writings, and who is the author, and that he should send a copy of them.

Cremonini’s interpretation of Aristotelian psychology and cosmology triggered life-long proceedings by the Roman Inquisition. In 1614, he was accused of believing in the mortality of the soul by Paolo Andrea d’Auria from Genoa, who for this very reason was condemned to a formal abjuration on 22 May of that year. In September of the same year, the accusation was formalized under three headings: the eternity of the heavens, the mortality of the soul, and the view of God as merely a final cause. Cremonini promised again and again to correct his views, but the cardinals of the Holy Office slowly became aware that in effect Cremonini was mocking them. And indeed, when he finally published his Apologia in 1616, the Holy Office discovered after three years that he had not corrected his errors but merely re-affirmed them. Cremonini repeatedly claimed he was offering a free interpretation of Aristotle, stressing the fact that he was not a theologian, but a philosopher, thus implicitly claiming that he was supposed to present faithful interpretations of the Greek philosopher. From 1619 the Holy Office openly threatened him, but in 1623 the Cardinals finally lost their temper and prohibited Cremonini’s De coelo, at first ‘donec corrigratur’, but then unconditionally. Cremonini, however, openly declared that he did not care about this prohibition. Indeed, during all these years the local ecclesiastical authorities duly obeyed the orders from Rome, but as the political authorities did not permit his extradition, there was no concrete sanction or consequence for his social status or career. Five years after his death, a group of qualificatores of the Holy Office established that his works contained not only erroneous, but also absolutely heretical propositions, in particular his denial of God’s omniscience, and the rational soul’s separability from the body.
3.4. Psychology and physiology

This section discusses the censorship of some seventeenth-century psychological treatises that advanced unorthodox views on the origin of the human soul.

3.4.1. Sennert’s Hypomnemata

Daniel Sennert (1572–1637) is notable for his contributions to the development of an early version of atomic theory. Sennert represented an intermediate step between corpuscular particle theory and Aristotelian forms of it. The same works that are often cited as demonstrating his early atomist views also emphasize the importance of substantial forms.

Reginaldo Lucarini’s censura of Sennert’s Hypomnemata physica (1636), commissioned by the Congregation of the Index, is almost entirely devoted to the fourth Hypomnemata, where the origin of the human soul is discussed. Sennert argued that the rational soul is not created but propagated through the seed. Sennert thus explicitly challenged Thomas Aquinas’s arguments against the physiological origin of the human soul in his Summa theologiae, defining them as ‘meras evasiones’ [mere evasions]. By contrast, Lucarini appeals to Holy Writ, the Church Fathers (in particular Augustine and Jerome), and to other works by Thomas Aquinas.

In addition, he explicitly challenges Sennert’s references to some biblical passages, namely, Genesis 46. 26: ‘cunctae animae quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum et egressae de femore illius’ [All the souls that went with Jacob into Egypt, and that came out of his thigh]; and Exodus 1. 5: ‘erant igitur omnes animae eorum qui egressi sunt de femore Iacob’ [And all the souls that came out of Jacob’s thigh]. Sennert also misinterpreted Genesis 2. 3: ‘quia in ipso cessaverat ab omni opere suo quod creavit Deus’ [because in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made], because from this quote he concluded that subsequently God only created new entities through miracles. Furthermore, Sennert wrongly claimed that all creatures are mortal. The former view was Origen’s heresy, condemned in several Councils (as we saw above), while the latter was censured in the Fifth Lateran Council.

Furthermore, Sennert argued that, as the soul does not subsist in the body, it cannot be created in the generation of man. According to Lucarini, Sennert deduced from a true premiss an erroneous and highly ‘audacious’ proposition. Finally, Sennert thought that it could not be held that the immortality of the soul was a ‘natural’ condition, rather it should be seen as a gift depending upon God’s free will. Now, this is a manifest heresy, also known as that of the Sadducees.

On the basis of this censura, the Congregation prohibited Sennert’s Hypomnemata on 12 May 1639 with the stipulation ‘donec corrigatur’.

3.4.2. Beccoli on the propagation of the soul

On 8 January 1642 Domenico Beccoli (1613–1650), a monk in the monastery of Monte Oliveto Maggiore, was ordered by the cardinals of the Holy Office to appear before them in Rome, because he had been denounced by the Inquisitor of Gubbio
in a letter dated 30 December 1641. From the outset his case was connected with
the views of Sennert. After only one week, on 15 January 1642, the Holy Office
wrote to the Inquisitor of Perugia, saying that he had taken the right decision in
not permitting the printing of the ‘conclusiones’ by Domenico Beccoli, who was
again invited to come to Rome. From the Inquisition decree of 29 January 1642,
the content of the contested ‘conclusiones’ can be deduced:

and ultimately, about the proposition ‘It is probable that the rational soul is not
brought forth by God, but propagated by the generation of living things in
virtue of God’s blessing “Be fruitful, and multiply”.’

The Cardinals decided to submit the proposition concerning the origin of the soul,
which clearly echoed Sennert’s view, to the consultors of the Holy Office, who
presented their verdicts at the meeting of 5 February. Fortunately, these verdicts
survive in the archive of the Congregation and offer a most illuminating example
of the wide range of definitions available to its members for labelling suspect or
heretical views:

The Holy Congregation of our Lords Consultants was held in the Palace of
the Holy Office, and a proposition on the propagation of the human soul was
proposed and examined namely:

It is probable that the rational soul is not produced by God through creation,
but propagated through the generation of living things in virtue of God’s
blessing ‘Be fruitful, and multiply’, and just as the tree produces a tree, so man
a man, and therefore the seed is animated like the fruit of a living being, and
that it is like a vehicle, as it were, through which the soul is transmitted to the
offspring.

According to the Father Fellow [of the Commissioner] the proposition was
not heretical in all its parts.

According to Father Ubaldini, as to its first part, namely that the soul is not
created by God, the proposition is erroneous and close to heresy; as to its second
part, including the remaining clauses, it is formally heretical.

Father Accarisi thought that the proposition that the soul is not created but
receives being through propagation was erroneous, and probably heretical.

Abbot Papirio judged that the proposition was close to heresy and erroneous
in faith.

Father Master Candidi judged that the proposition, about the creation of the
soul, was audacious, false, erroneous, and heretical, and that the second part was
liable to a similar censure.

Tommaso D’Afflitto judged that the proposition was audacious, false, and
erroneous, but not heretical.

Father Lucas Wadding held that the proposition was erroneous, futile,
suspect in faith, dangerous, and pernicious to the Christian commonwealth.

Father Terentius judged the proposition to be heretical (regardless of the
clause about the animated seed).

Father Campanella, Procurator of the Order of the Carmelites, judged that
as far as the parts which are subject to the Constitution of Theology were
concerned, the proposition was manifestly heretical, and that in the rest it
contained errors in philosophy.

The Consultor of Friars Minor Conventual judged that, in supposing the
soul is produced from pre-existing matter, the proposition was erroneous, but
if it intends the exclusion of a particular action of God, it is heretical.
The Procurator of the Order of St Augustine held the proposition to be formally heretical from a theological point of view. Abbot Ilario was of the opinion that the proposition was completely heretical. Oreggi qualified the proposition as heretical rather than erroneous. The Commissioner [of the Holy Office] held the proposition to be heretical and already condemned in the Lateran Council held under Leo X. The Master of the Sacred Palace judged the proposition to be completely heretical, and condemned in the Lateran Council. The General of the Order of the Friars Preachers held that the proposition was erroneous with all other inferior censures. Thus, eight of the consultors labelled Beccoli’s view as either formally heretical or else completely or plainly (‘omnino’, ‘manifeste’) heretical. The other consultors expressed their opinion with different shades of doubt or caution, using codified definitions, such as erroneous, pernicious, dangerous, false, audacious. Surprisingly, in the end, the Cardinals decided to define the proposition as merely erroneous, and condemned its author to a formal retraction.

3.4.3. Antonio Rocco: immortality cum traducianism

The case of Antonio Rocco’s (1586–1652) work on the soul is similar to Beccoli’s and develops shortly afterwards. On 7 December 1644 the Holy Office decided to submit the Frankfurt edition of his work, which was sent in by the Inquisitor of Venice on 19 November 1644, to the Congregation of the Index. After this, the work was examined by Agostino Ubaldini, who wrote an extensive censura, which was read during the meeting of 20 May 1645, and on the basis of which the Cardinals of the Inquisition decided to prohibit this work. Let us try to summarize this examination, which presents a detailed confutation of Rocco’s views.

At the outset of his censura Ubaldini states that the author’s intention to uphold the immortality of the soul together with its propagation through seed reveals his ignorance and contradictions. That the rational soul is not created by God was defined in February 1642 by some theologians of the Holy Office as heretical. Indeed, it plainly contradicts the doctrine found in Genesis, decrees passed in Councils (among which the Lateran Council under Innocent III), and the works of Thomas Aquinas, Gabriel Prateolus, and Augustine. The view that the soul’s generation does not contradict its immortality is seen as ‘erronea in bona philosophia’ [erroneous as far as correct philosophy is concerned]. Rocco’s conviction that the Church Councils only intended to define the soul’s immortality, and not its generation or creation, was defined as ‘temeraria, et periculosa in fide’ [rash, and dangerous in terms of faith], whereas entertaining the idea that God never revealed the human soul as ‘ingenerabilem, sive ingenitam’ [ungenerated, or unbegotten] was judged very close to heresy.

Next, the censor discusses a crucial point in Rocco’s argumentation: ‘Si anima nostra crearetur, non contraheremus peccatum originale ex semine Adae’ [If our soul were created, we would not contract original sin from the seed of Adam]. As a matter of fact, Rocco’s appeal to Augustine’s traducianism does not take into due account the context of Augustine’s theorizing, that is, his polemics with
Pelagius who simply denied the transmission of original sin. Elsewhere, his use of Augustine’s works and views is also criticized. Furthermore, the animation of the seed is heretical, and the divisibility of the soul is seen as a ‘propositio absurdissima’ [most absurd proposition].

Finally, Rocco’s view that the rational soul is mortal according to the principles of Aristotle contradicts the Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X, and Rocco’s conclusion that its immortality is to be viewed as ‘ab externo tantum’ [something solely external] was defined as ‘temeraria, periculosa, sapiens haeresin’ [rash, dangerous, bordering on heresy]. Ubaldini’s final conclusion is worth quoting:

On page 183, the author warns the reader that without any hesitation he holds the immortality of the soul as utterly undoubted and immutable, whether it be by means of an opinion, whether it be by faith, whether it be by agreement, or by imagination, or in a dream. This proposition alone, in my opinion, would suffice to make a decision as to the doctrine and the intention of this book, as the author makes the certainty of the immortality of the soul dependent on the very opinion and agreement of anyone, and indeed on imagination and dreams, rather than on faith. And again he equates the immovable firmness of Catholic faith with the inconstancy of the imagination, and evanescence of dreams. And I do not know whether in this case anything more wicked and blasphemous can be babbled or imagined.

As mentioned earlier, on the basis of these condemnations Rocco’s work was unconditionally banned at the meeting of 20 May 1645.

4. Sanctions

Psychological heterodoxy developed under several guises, and it was analysed, labelled and evaluated by the bodies of doctrinal control with a wide range of qualifications. As a consequence, trials and examinations ended up with different outcomes and a range of sanctions. Index proceedings dealt with books and manuscripts (often by authors who were already dead), and as a rule had a rather limited number of possible outcomes. The text could be prohibited, totally or conditionally, or the Congregation could simply decide to do nothing at all. Thus, the censurae of Giorgio, Patrizi and Cremonini led to the prohibition of their works, while the doubts about and the examinations of Zabarella’s and Havenreuter’s De anima commentaries did not force the Congregation into any formal ban or decision. Huarte’s Examen was at first prohibited, but in 1596 his work was removed from the Index.

By contrast, the proceedings of the Holy Office show a rich and extremely variegated spectrum of views, examinations, and sanctions regarding matters psychological. When the heresy or heterodoxy was professed only in speech, it could be confessed and thus absolved ‘in foro conscientiae’ [in the tribunal of private conscience], possibly preceded by a verbal abjuration. Sometimes, when only vague doubts were at stake, the defendant asked explicitly to be absolved in this way. As a rule, it was granted on the condition that possible accomplices were denounced.

Public teaching and the publishing of printed works compounded conflicts and
sanctions. Domenico Beccoli planned to publish some theological ‘conclusiones’, among which one, regarding the origin of the human soul, was clearly inspired by Sennert’s work. His manuscript was examined by sixteen consultors of the Holy Office, and eventually the incriminated view was judged erroneous and the author condemned to recant his views. However, the pronouncements by the officials covered a wide range of heterodoxy, and only half of them agreed on the heretical character of Beccoli’s view.

Antonio Rocco’s case was transferred from the Holy Office to the Index. One of the latter’s consultors wrote an extensive censura, which led the Congregation to prohibit the book unconditionally.

Of course the spread of Cartesianism and atomism in the second half of the seventeenth century would later lead the Roman bodies of doctrinal control to further investigations into heterodox philosophical psychology, but that is another story.

Appendix

Passage 1 (see n. 44)
Considerano questi miei Illustrissimi signori della congregazione del Indice nel valor suo in darli pensiero da rivedere li comentarij del Zabarella, sopra l’anima, et in particolare piu luoghi, dove con Aristotele pruova la mortalita dell’anima, pruovando accomodarli in maniera, che non solo si ponga la verita di quello, che si deve tenere per fede, et con la buona philosofia, ma ributando, et sciogliendo anco l’istessi argumenti, che dal testo di Aristotele raccoglie, et di tutti questi luoghi accomodati ne mandarà nota accio appruovandosi si permetta che il libro si stampi con che fine alle sue.

Passage 2 (see n. 45)
Onde infinitamente ringratio Vostra Signoria Illustrissima insieme con tutti l’Illustrissimi signori suoi colleghi miei signori della buona opinione c’hanno di me, d’havermi giudicato atto a tale opera ma invero, ci trovo molte difficoltà, et dal canto mio, et da quello dei figlioli del Zabarella. Dal canto mio, perché non solo mi si comanda, ch’io vegga i luoghi, che son contrarj alla verità, et buona filosofia, ma che debba fare, che di dove esso cava la mortalità, ch’io ne cavi l’immortalità, con ribattere, et sciogliere i suoi argomenti; questa è fatica d’importanza, atteso che ricerca grande, et fresco studio delle cose di filosofia, le quali molti anni sono, da me sono state tralasciate, et son stato occupato nelle cose della mia professione, secondo, che s’è convenuto all’età senile, et al punto sono di anni 67. Inoltre di ciò quest’opera, dovendosi mettere in luce, ricerca una persona libera e non una obligata come son’io. Dal lato de’ figlioli del Zabarella vi è difficoltà, perché essi vorrebbeno, che fossiro stampati i commentarij del loro padre, et non i miei, perché se s’ha da fare tutto quello, che Vostra Signoria Illustrissima comanda, i comentarij, si domanderanno più tosto miei che suoi, perché bisognera mettere tutta l’opera sotto sopra, con dar diverse interpretazioni, et far diversa concatenatione, et porre diversi fondamenti. Ma se il negotio consistesse in notare solamente i luoghi repugnanti alla verità, quest’è cosa che si potrebbe fare da molti, et essi figlioli del Zabarella se ne contentarebbono, pur che non fusse alterata l’interpretatione, et connessione del testo.
Passage 3 (see n. 55)


Passage 4 (see n. 75)

Habita S. Congregatio DD. Qualificatorum in Palatio S. Officiij, in qua proposita et examinata propositione quondam animae humanae propagationem videlicet:

Probabile est animam rationalem non produci à Deo per creationem sed propagari per generationem viventium ex vi benedictionis Dei Crescite et multiplicamini et sicut arbor arborem producit, ita homo hominem, ac proinde semem esse animatum inclusi fructus viventis, et se habere veluti vehiculum per quod traducitur anima in sobolem.

Pater socius fuit in voto propositionem non omnes sui partes esse haereticam.

P. Ubaldinus fuit in voto propositionem quo ad primam partem seu non creari à Deo esse erroneam, et proximam haeresi, quo ad 2.° partem quae claudit reliquas omnes clausulas esse formaliter haereticam.

P. Accarisius putabat propositionem esse quo ad illam partem non creari sed habere esse per propagationem erroneam, et probabiliter haereticam.

D. Abbas Papirius censuit propositionem esse proximam haeresi et erroneam in fide.

P. Magister Candidus censuit propositionem quo ad creationem esse temerarium, falsam, erroneam, et haereticam, 2.° partem eadem prorsus censuram notavit.

D. Thomas Afflictus censuit propositionem esse temerarium, falsam, erroneam non tamen haereticam.

P. Lucas Wadingus censerat propositionem esse erroneam, vanam, suspectam in fide, periculosam, et perniciosam reipublicae christianae.

P. Terentius censuit (detracta clausula de semine animato) propositionem esse haereticam.

P. Campanella Procurator Ordinis Carmelitarum censuit propositionem quo ad omnes partes quae subduntur Constitutioni Theologiae esse manifeste haereticam, in reliquis errores continet in philosophia.

P. Consultor Minorum Conventualium censuit propositionem si […] quod anima producatur ex praexistenti materia esse erroneam, si vero intelligitur exclusa actioni particulari Dei esse haereticam.

P. Procurator Ordinis S. Augustini censuit propositionem theologice inspectam esse formaliter haereticam.

P. Abbas Hilarius censuit propositionem esse omnino haereticam.

D. Oregius censuit propositionem potius haereticam quam erroneam.

P. Commissarius censuit propositionem esse haereticam et iam in Concilio Lateranensi damnatum sub Leone X.°

P. Magister S. Palatij censuit propositionem esse omnino haereticam et in Concilio Lateranensi damnatum.

P. generalis Ordinis Praedicatorum fuit in voto propositionem esse erroneum cum omnibus caeteris inferioribus censuris.
Passage 5 (n. 89)

Pagina 183. Auctor monet lectorem, ut absque haesitatione ulla tenat immortalitatem animae, quam certissimam, et immutabilem, sive per opinionem, sive per fidem, sive per plactum, sive per imaginationem, sive per somnium.

Haec sola Propositio, meo iudicio, sufficeret, ad decernandum de doctrina, et mente in hoc libro, dum certitudinem immortalitatis animae nostrae facit dependentem non minus à propria uniuscuiusque opinione, et placto, imò et ab imaginatione, et somnio, quam à fide. Et rursum fidei Catholicæ immobilem firmitatem aequiparat inconstantiae imaginationis, et lenitati somnij, quibus nescio an aliquid magis impium, et blasphemum hac in re effutiri possit, et excogitari.

Notes to Chapter 13


3. 'Insuper omnibus et singulis philosophis in universitatibus studiorum generalium et alibi publice legentibus districte praecipiendō mandamus, ut quum philosophorum principia aut conclusiones in quibus a recta fide deviare noscantur, auditoribus suis legerint seu explicaverint qualis hoc est de animae mortalitate aut unitate et mundi aeternitate, ac alia huiusmodi, teneantur eisdem veritatem religionis christianae omni conatu manifestam facere et persuadendo pro posse docere, ac omni studio huiusmodi philosophorum argumenta, quom omnia solubilia existant, pro viribus exclusere atque resolvere.' See Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, ed. by Giuseppe Alberigo and others (Bologna: Istituto per le scienze religiose, 1973), pp. 605–06. This papal Bull was also published by Francisco Peña in his edition of Eymeric’s Directorium inquisitorum, a seminal document in the development of inquisitorial legislation; see Nicolaus Eymeric, Directorium inquisitorum r.p.f. Nicolai Eymerici denuo ex collatione plurium exemplarium emendatum ..., Cum scholis seu annotationibus eruditissimis Francisci Pegnae (Rome: Stamperia del Popolo Romano, 1578), pp. 53–54.


7. Tertullian, De anima, ch. 4; cf. 9. 7.

8. Tertullian, De anima, ch. 22. 6 and 27.

9. Origen, De principiis, i. 8. 8; see Origenes, De principiis libri IV, ed. by Herwig Görgemanns and Heinrich Karpp (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), p. 400.

10. Origen, Commentary on Romans, 1. 18.

11. Moreover, after the translation of Avicenna’s works, psychology would be more clearly

12. Neoplatonic commentaries already emphasized Aristotle’s alleged belief in the immortality of the soul, unwittingly providing him with a patent of acceptability for Christianity.


14. It should be noted that during the period of the so-called ‘first Averroism’, Averroes’s De anima commentary was not interpreted as defending the uniqueness of the human intellect; cf. René Antoine Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier “averroïsme”’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 66 (1982), 321–74.


21. At the end of the fifteenth century, this position was also endorsed by Nicoletto Vernia, who later recanted. See Edward P. Mahoney, ‘Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: An unnoticed dispute’, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 23 (1968), 268–96.


26. See the letter by the Holy Office to a peripheral Inquisitor (dated 13 February 1593) regarding an anonymous professor of philosophy, in the Archive of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (ACDF), Sanctum Officium, Stanza Storica, Q.3.d, fol. 487v: ‘[...] crede, che la verità contenuta nella vera filosofia sia contraria alla Verità [...] della Sacra Scrittura, con altre interrogazioni, che a lei pareranno necessarie, et opportune; et restando nelle stesse risposte fatte altre volte, V. R. espèderà la sua causa, sospendendolo dalla lettura, et esercitio d’insegnare per spatio di tre anni, ma sopravenendo altro, et havendo qualche dubio, ne darà avviso.’
27. This was the position of the so-called Psychopannychists; see Norman T. Burns, *Christian Mortalism from Tyndale to Milton* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
28. ACDF, St. St., LL.3.c, 426°v.
29. *Index des livres interdits*, ed. Jésus Martínez de Bujanda and others, 10 vols (Sherbrooke: Centre d’Études de la Renaissance, Université de Sherbrooke; Geneva: Droz, 1980–1996), IX, 229 (henceforth *ILI* with volume and page number).
30. ACDF, Index, *Protocolli*, H (II.a.7), fol. 319°v; this censura was read at the meeting of 19 November 1587 (see *Diari*, 1, fol. 28°), and it is published in Peter Godman, *The Saint as Censor. Robert Bellarmine Between Inquisition and Index* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 243–44.
33. Genesis 2. 1–3.
39. In 1587, Vincenzo Bonardi composed a *Modus et ratio expurgandi vel corrigendi libros*; the text is in ACDF, Index, *Protocolli*, M (II.a.10), fols 124°–125°. See also ACDF, Index, *Diari*, 1, fol. 20°. Comments by Ruggigio, Peña, Allen, Morin, and an anonymous author are in ACDF, Index, *Protocolli*, B (II.a.2), fols 528°–537°. On 8 October 1594, Marcanzio Colonna handed over to his censors a printed *Instructio pro expurgatione et impressione librorum*; cf. ACDF, Index, *Diari*, 1, fol. 81°. This text was probably the basis for the *Instructio* printed in Clement VIII’s Index (*ILI*, IX, 859–62).
42. See, for example, De Castro, *Adversus omnes haereses libri quatuordecim*, fols 99°–112°.
43. ACDF, Index, *Diari*, 1, fol. 148°.
44. ACDF, Index, V, fol. 142°. For the original text of the longer passages quoted, see Appendix.
45. ACDF, Index, III.7, fol. 376°v.
46. ACDF, Index, V, fols 142°–143°.
48. ACDF, Index, *Protocolli*, G (II.a.6), fol. 45°; another copy is in ACDF, Index, *Protocolli*, S (II.a.17), fol. 45°. See also *Diari*, 2, fol. 2, fol. 30°v.
49. ACDF, Index, *Protocolli*, G (II.a.6), fol. 45°: ‘Si homo generatur, quod simul ipsius animus generetur, et quod in semine hominis potestate insit animus, et postea in actu traducatur, cum primum foetus homo appellari potest. Quam propositionem probat (sed malè) ex Aristotele, ex rationibus, et sacris litteris. Illas autem probationes solvit D. Thomas prima parte q. 118. a. 2. ubi ponit censuram et ibi Cajetanus.’
51. See the annotation in ACDF, Index, Protocolli, Y (II.a.21), fol. 263v.
52. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1598, fol. 296v: ‘Caesarii Cremonini lectoris publici Paduae, qui legit de Anima ad mentem Alexandri Afrodisei lectis literis Inquisitoris Veneti datis 12 superioris mensis III. etc decreverunt et ordinaverunt quod scribatur episcopo et Inquisitori Paduae, ut se informent, et providant.’
55. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1607, fol. 146v.
57. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1614, pp. 452–54.
58. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1619, pp. 146–47.
59. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1619, p. 206: ‘Inquisitoris Paduae lectis literis datis die X. a maij, quibus scribit significasse Cesarii Cremonini observationes nuper factas ad apologiam de quinta Caeli substantia, antequam illam imprimere, et tunc respondisse, solutionem argumentorum Aristotelis contrariorum fidei christianae, non spectasse ad philosophum, sed ad theologum, cui ipse se prompte subscribet, ac etiam subiunxisse quod si id Sacrae Congregationis non plenè satisficisset, non de occasione ulterius scribendi.’
61. ACDF, SO, St. St., N.4.c, fasc. 18, fol. 17r-v (unnumbered folios).
62. ACDF, Index, Protocolli, EE (II.a.27), fols 31r–34v.
63. Daniel Sennert, Hypomnemata physica: I. De rerum naturalium principiis; II. De occultis qualitatibus; III. De atomis & mistione; IV. De generatione viventium; V. De spontaneo viventium ortu (Frankfurt: Caspar Rotel for Clement Schleich and associates, 1636).
64. Sennert, Hypomnemata physica, pp. 259–60.
65. Summa theologiae, q. 118, art. 2.
66. ACDF, Index, Protocolli, EE (II.a.27), fol. 31v.
67. He cites: De potentia, q. 9; Summa contra Gentiles, book II, ch. 86, in particular the polemics against Apollinaris.
68. ACDF, Index, Protocolli, EE (II.a.27), fol. 32v-v.
69. The Sadducees denied the immortality of the soul and the existence of angels, and maintained the religious law in all its strictness. Many of their ideas and practices resurfaced in medieval Jewish sects after Pharisee ideas dominated among the dispersed Jews of the Western Roman Empire.
70. ACDF, Index, Diari, 4, fols 62v, 63v; cf. III, XI, 828.
71. Domenico Beccoli was a nobleman from Gubbio.
72. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1642, fol. 4v: ‘Literis Inquisitoris Eugubij datis 30 Decembris rescribatur D. Dominicum Beccolum olivetanum se portasse in hoc S. Offitio, et fuisse receptum librum Danielis Sannarti.’
73. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1642, fol. 10v.
74. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1642, fol. 20v-v: ‘et precipuè circa propositionem Probabile est anima rationalis non produci à Deo, sed propagari per generationem viventium ex vi benedictionis Dei crescite, et multiplicamini’.
75. ACDF, SO, St. St., O.1.a, fasc. 20, fols 150r, 151r–152v.
77. ACDF, SO, Decreta, 1642, fols 23v–24v: ‘Relata Censura PP. Theologorum qualificatorum huius Sancti Officij facta ad propositionem de anima, quam disputandum proposuerat D. Dominicus
[24] Beccolus Eugubinus Monacus Olivitanus, videlicet Probabile est Homo non creari à Deo, sed propagari per generationem ex vi benedictionis Dei et per semen veluti vehiculum traduci in sobolem. Em. DD. audito etiam eius examine facto in hoc S. Officio, habuerunt propositionem pro erronea, mandaruntque per dictum D. Dominicum fore retractationem iuxta formam sibi proscribendum.'

78. Antonio Rocco, *Animae rationalis immortalitas simul cum ipsius vera propagatione ex semine, via quadam sublimi peripatetica, non hactenus post Aristotelem signata vestigiis, exercitationis philosophicae illihataeque veritatis gratia indagatur* (Frankfurt: Hertz, 1644).

80. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fols 80 r-84 v.
82. See the pronouncements on Beccoli above.
83. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fol. 80 r.
84. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fol. 80 r.
85. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fol. 81 r. For the scale of heterodoxy, see note 75.
86. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fol. 81 r v.
87. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fol. 82 r.
88. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fols 83 r, 84 v.
89. ACDF, *Index*, *Protocoll*, DD (II.a.26), fol. 84 v.
90. ACDF, *SO*, *Decreta*, 1650, fol. 154 r-v: ‘Lecto memoriali exhibito nomine N. Poenitentis, qui dubitavit circa Infernum, Purgatorium, remissionem peccatorum, et Immortalitatem Animarum; Em. DD. concesserunt facultatem Confessario Oratorum absolvendi in foro Conscientia prævia verbali abiuratione in actu Sacramentalij Confessionis.’
92. See the previous note, and ACDF, *SO*, *Decreta*, 1655, fol. 49 r: ‘D. Sebastiani Baliani Plebani Terrae Bastiae petentis facultatem absolvendi quendam presbiterum, qui de immortalitate animae, de divinitate Christi, et de aliis articulis fidei Catholicae dubitavit, ac cum ipso dispensandi super irregularitate hac occasione contracta, ac etiam quia aliquos blasphemantes audivit, et non denunciavit S. Officio; Decretum ei scribendum ut dictum presbiterum absolvit in foro conscientiae, et cum eo super irregularitate dispensat, dummodo primum se disponat ad deponentium in S. Officio blasphemos haereticales, quos audivit, et non alias.’
From its earliest beginnings, psychology has been faced with a number of questions. The initial question of how to define psychology helped establish it as a science separate from physiology and philosophy. Additional questions that psychologists have faced throughout history include: Which topics and issues should psychology be concerned with? Background: Philosophy and Physiology. While psychology did not emerge as a separate discipline until the late 1800s, its earliest history can be traced back to the time of the early Greeks. During the 17th-century, the French philosopher Rene Descartes introduced the idea of dualism, which asserted that the mind and body were two entities that interact to form the human experience. Download Citation | Professionalization and Clerical Identity: Notes On the Early Modern Catholic Priest | This contribution critiques the current practice of studying the early modern Catholic clergy within the parameters of confessionalization and | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. Comments on the J. Martin and J. Sugarman (see record 2000-08148-003) discussion on the relationship between modern and postmodern approaches to psychology. King John construes the political relations of early modern sovereignty through the [Show full abstract] â€œhand. This article argues that this construal allows the play to critique sovereign agency, representing it through synecdoche and understanding sovereign agency as a form of prosthesis. Though Khalily uses modern CBT terminologies, such as â€œcognitive restructuringâ€​, to describe some of these interventions, they are demonstrations of early indigenous Islamic methodologies that included cognitive strategies preceding the birth of CBT in the 20th century. He also highlights a relational model of understanding human personality from an Islamic perspective. Modern Catholic Thinkers / Reformers. << Back to the Resources page. Flannery Oâ€™Connor ___ Jacques Maritain ___ John Henry Newman ___ Sigrid Undset. Resources/Links to a Sample of Modern Catholic Theologians / Historians / Writers/Activists Religious Reformers The modern Catholic tradition contains an array of distinguished scholars who have major contributions to diverse disciplines: theologians, philosophers, political theorists, social scientists, and scientists. Converts to Catholicism have played a remarkably prominent role in shaping modern Catholic culture. The following list is selective and dependent, in part, on the availability of significant web resources for particular authors.