Temporal Justice*

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I. Taking Time into Account

Certain aspects of temporal injustice are familiar enough. We are familiar with notions of justice across time: demands that we rectify historical injustices; demands that we practice justice between generations. This paper concerns instead the justice of the distribution of time (or, more precisely, discretionary control over one's time) among people within the same timeslice.

In one way, that issue looks like a non-issue. It is firmly fixed in the fabric of the universe that everyone has exactly 24 hours in their day: no more, no less. Some people's lives last longer than others', but that is an across-time issue of the other sort. Some people might use their time better than others, or derive greater rewards or satisfaction from the same unit of time; but surely how effectively you use a good to which you are justly entitled has nothing to do with your just entitlement to it.¹

What I shall be focusing on here is not time, tout court, but rather 'discretionary time'. That is time over which you have autonomous control, after satisfying the demands of necessity in three dimensions: securing at least a minimal income necessary to avoid poverty; doing as much unpaid household labour (shopping, cooking, cleaning, childcare) as is strictly necessary to keep your household functioning; and doing the minimum
necessary to keep your body functioning (eating, sleeping, grooming, etc.).

How much time it is necessary for a person to spend in those three activities varies substantially across people (depending primarily on their wage rates and household structures) and to a lesser extent across countries (depending in part on social influences and in part on legal and welfare provisions).

The time left over, after you have done the minimum necessary in all those dimensions, is 'discretionary time'. That represents the scope within which an agent can exercise her agency, pursuing projects of her choosing rather than bowing to the dictates of physiological, social or economic necessity.

I suggest that we should prioritize 'discretionary time' in the same way and for the same reason that Rawls says we should prioritize 'self-respect' as 'primary among primary goods'.\(^2\) Without self-respect, one does not have the psychological wherewithal to make effective use of any of the other primary goods. In the same way, having time free to devote to them is a necessary input into any other projects one might care to pursue.

II. Ideal Theory and Real World Distruenda

Theories of justice are idealizations in various respects. They typically idealize as regards people's motivations: ideal theory assumes 'full compliance', and must therefore be adjusted in applications to the real world

\(^1\) Although friends of Friedman's (1947) 'utility monster' wuld of course say that your entitlement t it is a function of how effectively you would use it.

\(^2\) Rawls 1971, sec. 67.
where we will only ever have partial compliance with the dictates of a theory of justice like Rawls's.³

Ideal theory also typically idealizes as regards instruments. It assumes they are completely effective, costlessly efficient. The prescriptions of ideal theory must therefore be adjusted in light of the real costs of pursuing justice, the relative rates (and directions) of the errors of the inevitably imperfect instruments of justice available in the non-ideal real world.

Ideal theory also typically idealizes as regards what is being distributed. Ideal theories of justice are often phrased as if happiness or welfare or dignity is something that can itself be allocated and reallocated socially – as if those things can be directly delivered to people, through an act of will on the part of society or its officials.

All those idealizations are problematic, of course. But it is that latter idealization with which I shall be particularly concerned here. I shall be discussing the ways in which different social arrangements might give people more or less 'discretionary time' and hence 'temporal autonomy'. But of course how much good it does an agent to have such autonomy depends upon how she exercises that autonomy. Discretionary time is far from atypical in this respect, however. In the real world in which social policymakers operate, there are typically no mechanisms by which they can directly pursue the effects that ideal theories of justice specify. They can usually only pursue those effects indirectly.

³ Rawls 1971, pp. 8, 245.
Students of public policy have learnt to distinguish 'input' from 'outputs' and 'outcomes'. What ideal theories typically identify is the just distribution specified in terms of outcomes. But the only things that can usually be socially allocated and reallocated, pursuant to theories of justice, are inputs – resources, like money, or foodstuffs, or medical care, or discretionary time.

Some theorists of justice, making a virtue of that necessity, respecify their ideal theory of justice in precisely those terms (of 'equal resources' or 'equal opportunities' or such like). Whether or not that is the right theory of justice at the level of ideal theory is a moot point, because that is in any case inevitable at the level of non-ideal practice. Allocating and reallocating resources and opportunities is, realistically, all that social policymakers can usually do in pursuit of whatever ideal theory of justice might be specified.

III. The Temporal Welfare Divide, and How to Close It

The central methodological proposal of this paper is that we consider a new distribuendum of social justice: discretionary time.

I define that concept, and describe how it can be operationalized, in Section III.A. I then go on in subsequent sections to describe how discretionary time is distributed in each of 6 countries. Two are liberal welfare-gender regimes: the US and Australia. Two are conservative-
corporatist regimes: Germany and France. Two are social-democratic regimes: Sweden and Finland.

In Section III.B I discuss the gap in discretionary time in each of those countries between the most temporally privileged group in society (dual-earners with no kids) and the most temporally under-privileged group (lone mothers). In Section III.C I discuss what government can do to help close that gap, firstly through financial contributions (taxes, transfer payments and child-care subsidies) and secondly through changing the terms of divorce.

These empirical results are based on the analysis of Luxembourg Income Study and Multinational Time-Use Survey data from the decade of the 1990s. These results are reported more fully in Discretionary Time, a book coauthored with James Mahmud Rice, Antti Parpo and Lina Eriksson to be published in 2007 or early 2008.

A. Defining and Operationalizing 'Discretionary Time'

By 'discretionary time', I mean time over which you have discretionary control. That is distinguished from time that it is strictly necessary to spend in 3 categories of activities that it is strictly necessary to perform:

4 Full details can be found at their web sites, <www.lisproject.org> and <http://www.timeuse.org/mtus/> respectively.
5 The full manuscript, with appendices exhaustively detailing the results and methodology, can be accessed on-line at: <socpol.anu.edu.au/discretionary_time>.
• paid labour, sufficient to secure at least a poverty-level income⁶;
• unpaid labour, sufficient to maintain a household like yours; and
• personal care, sufficient to meet your bodily needs.⁷

How much discretionary time you have is simply 24 hours a day, minus 'necessary time in paid labour', minus 'necessary time in unpaid labour', minus 'necessary time in personal care'. Discretionary time, in other words, is the realm of temporal autonomy that remains, after the claims of necessity in these 3 realms have been met.

Of course, most people will want to spend some of their discretionary time doing more than strictly necessary in each of those dimensions. Most people want more than a poverty-level income and spend extra time in paid labour to achieve that. But poverty is 'necessity'; any time they spent to earn more than that is discretionary. Likewise, people generally want a tidier house than the minimum that would be socially acceptable, and they spend more time than strictly necessary in unpaid labour in the household to achieve that: but again, anything beyond the strictly necessary is discretionary. Likewise all those extra hours, beyond the strictly necessary, that people enjoy spending in bed or over the dinner table.

⁶ Strictly speaking, the necessity is to secure a poverty-level income. Working in paid labour is one way of doing that; marrying or inheriting or investing well is another; living off the government is (in some places) another. The calculations reported below focus purely on people who are in paid labour, but they take account of how much income from all those other sources those people receive in determining how much income from paid labour they need to get themselves above the poverty line.

⁷ There is a social as well as biological aspect to this: how often you wash, and how well groomed you need to be, is a matter of social much more than biological necessity; and those things vary from country to country.
My measure of 'discretionary time' is importantly different from the standard time-use category of 'free time'. Free time, as time-use research (and the popular press) ordinarily construes it, is time not actually spent in any of those 3 core activities. But if (as typically they do) people actually spend more time than strictly necessary in those activities, 'free time' underestimates, perhaps badly, how much 'discretionary time' people actually have. And it is discretionary time – temporal resources over which people have discretionary control – that should concern a theorist of social justice. In temporal terms as in monetary ones, what ought concern us is how much people have to spend, not what they have left over after their spending. This distinction becomes vitally important in our discussion in Section III.B below.

The operationalization of all the key variables involved in the calculation of discretionary time is discussed in depth in the book mentioned above. Here I give only the broadest outline.

In calculating 'necessary time in paid labour', we determine how long it would take each person in each of the Luxembourg Income Study files under study to earn a poverty-level income at his or her existing wage rate. 'Poverty' is defined, per the 'old OECD poverty line', as 'half the median equivalent income' in the country as a whole'. In households with multiple earners, responsibility for getting the household income up to the poverty

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8 I.e, adjusting for household size: the equivalence scale we use is one of the standard ones, the square root of the number of persons in the household.
9 For details, see: Atkinson 1998, lecture 1; Goodin et al. 1999, ch. 8.
line is apportioned among them in the same proportion as the ratio of their current earnings. Adjustments are made for the time that it is necessary to spend traveling to work and to pay for childcare, if necessary, while working.

We specify 'necessary time in unpaid household labour' analogously. How much time you strictly need to spend in unpaid labour at home is crucially dependent on the size and structure of your households. We thus index our 'necessary time in unpaid household labour' indicator to 3 things: the number of people in the household; whether or not there is preschool-aged child in the household; and in households with preschool-aged children, whether or not there is a stay-at-home adult to mind them. We estimate 'necessary time in unpaid household labour' separately for each of those groups, taking as our measure of necessity 'half the median equivalent' unpaid household labour time that is actually done in households of that type across the country as a whole'. Where there are multiple adults in the household, responsibility for unpaid household labour is again apportioned among them in same proportion as the time they are currently spending in unpaid household labour.

When it comes to 'necessary time in personal care', the 'half median' methodology would yield estimates of necessity that are way too low. (Surely people need more than 5 hours a day to sleep, eat, groom, etc.) We

\[ \text{\ldots} \]

\[ ^{10} \text{Once again we render equivalent households of different sizes by dividing by the square-root of the number of persons in the household.} \]

\[ ^{11} \text{This estimate, and that for personal care below, is derived from the corresponding file in the Multinational Time-Use Surveys. Estimates derived in these ways from the} \]
therefore specify 'necessity' in this dimension as 'four-fifths the median amount of time actually spent in personal care across the country as a whole'.

Note that 'necessity' here relates to what is socially unacceptable. It is not literally impossible for people to do less in each of these dimensions; indeed, around 10% of people do so in each of these 3 dimensions across the countries under study. But we ought not set our poverty line so low that literally no one in the country fell below it (convenient though politicians might find that). The poverty line, in money and all these other dimensions as well, represents not a threshold below which it is physically or logically impossible to fall, but rather a threshold below which it is socially unacceptable to let people fall.

Discretionary time, as I have said, is just 24 hours a day minus the amount of time that it is 'necessary' (thus calculated) to spend in all of those 3 core activities. How much discretionary time you have varies across countries. Among the 6 countries under study, it ranges from lows around 73 to 74 hours a week in France and the US to highs of around 82 to 84 hours a week in Sweden and Finland, averaging across everyone of prime working age (25 to 55) in those countries.

Those differences in themselves are of considerable interest, of course. But from the point of view of temporal justice, what of most concern is the difference in discretionary time between different groups within any given country. It is to those issues that I now turn.

MTUS files are then simply written onto the LIS files, which form the basis for all
subsequent analyses.
B. Temporal Inequality

To put the 'social justice' question in its most pointed form, I here concentrate on the discretionary time available to the most temporally privileged compared to the most temporally underprivileged.

Across the 6 countries under study, the group the most discretionary time on average is almost invariably dual-earner households with no kids (DINKs). Invariably, those with least discretionary time on average are the lone mothers.

Figure 1 shows the mean discretionary time of each group in all 6 countries. To compare like with like, Figure 1 concentrates on the female member of childless dual-income households, and compares her discretionary time to lone mothers'.

As we see in Figure 1, the magnitude of the inequality in discretionary time between these best-off and worst-off groups varies from country to country. At its lowest, the gap is around 26 hours a week in Sweden, France and Australia (thus cutting across all the traditional regime types). At its highest, it is 42 hours a week in the US, and over 30 in Germany and Finland.

[Figure 1 about here]
Females, even in childless dual-earner couples, have slightly lower wage rates and slightly less discretionary time than their husbands.
Figure 1: Mean discretionary time, lone mothers compared to female DINKs
I shall return to those country differences shortly. The first thing to notice, however, is that there is an absolutely huge inequality in discretionary time between lone mothers and DINKs, and that is true wherever we look.

One of the great advantages of cashing out these differences in temporal terms is that time is a universal metric, immediately accessible and interpersonally comparable. An hour is an hour, identically for everyone worldwide. So when we say that, even in the best case (Sweden), lone mothers have 26 hours a week less discretionary time than DINKs, we all know what that means. Thinking of the ordinary workday as 8 hours, that is like lone mothers having to work more than 3 days a week more than DINKs. That's a big difference, by anyone's standards. And the 42 hour differential in the US is even worse: it is like lone mothers having to work 5 days a week more than DINKs.

Above I emphasized the importance, in assessing the justice of temporal distributions, of looking at 'discretionary time' instead of the more common time-use category of sheer 'free time'. The former represents the total stock of resources over which you have discretionary control. The latter represents the amount of resources remaining, after you have spent some of your stock.

In the popular press, and even in some of the academic time-use literature, when we hear stories of 'the time bind' and 'the overworked
American' it is invariably the latter ('free time') to which that refers. The existing time-use literature is based purely on surveys asking how people use their time, with no assessment of whether they 'strictly need' or 'merely choose' to spend their time in those ways.

Differentiating the two proves crucial in assessing the situations of lone mothers versus DINKs. As Figure 2 shows, were we to judge purely in those traditional terms of 'free time' (time not actually spent in paid or unpaid labour or personal care), it would seem that the two are temporally pretty much on a par. DINKs have a little – but only a little – more free time than lone mothers, looking at the darker first bars in each suite of bars in Figure 2. Looking at the lighter bars showing 'discretionary time' (how much time it is not strictly necessary for them to spend in those activities), however, it is clear that DINKs are very, very much better off than lone mothers.

[Figure 2 about here]

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Figure 2: Mean discretionary time compared to free time, lone mothers and female DINKs
It is no mystery why that should be so. DINKs do indeed spend long hours at the office. The difference is that they do not strictly need to do so (to earn a poverty-level income anyway), whereas the lone mother genuinely has to spend a much larger proportion of the time she does in core activities in order to meet bare necessities.

C. What Can Government Do?

In discussing what can governments do to help close that gap, I shall canvass two sorts of contributions and calibrate their importance relative to one another empirically through the metric of discretionary time.

First, government can help reduce inequalities through financial contributions. Taxes and transfer payments are the traditional focus in such discussions. But free or subsidized provision of in-kind goods and services are important as well. Of particular relevance to the inequality under discussion here is publicly subsidized child care.

Second, government can help reduce the inequalities between DINKs and lone parents by shaping the terms of divorce. Here I shall be comparing 3 distinct 'divorce regimes' that might be imposed by, or encouraged through, state policy. These 3 regimes differ according to whether or not the non-custodial parent is obliged to help with the costs and/or the care of the kids.
The first issue is addressed by looking across the 6 countries' different policy practices, assessing state financial contributions in terms of how much discretionary time they give lone mothers on average. The second issue is addressed by projecting what would happen to the discretionary time of lone mothers if terms of divorce were set in each of those 3 different ways.

i. Financial Contributions

In principle, inequalities can be reduced in either (or both) taking from the rich or giving to the poor. Most states do a bit of both.

In the comparison under discussion the 'well off' are DINKs, blest with vastly more discretionary time than lone mothers. In all 6 countries under consideration, governments' tax-and-spend policies have the effect of reducing the discretionary time of DINKs. But they pretty much all do so by the same modest amount (an hour or two a week, compared to what DINKs would have had in the absence of those policies). In searching for the real drivers of difference among welfare-gender regimes, I shall therefore focus on the state's treatment of the worst-off, lone mothers.

As we see from Figure 3, the value of the state's financial contributions, through the tax-transfer system and publicly subsidized child care, contributes positively to lone mothers' discretionary time in all countries -
with the conspicuous exception of Germany. There, the state takes from long
mothers (through taxes) about as much discretionary time as the best of the
other countries give to them (through transfer payments and publicly
subsidized child care: which of those matters more varies from country to
country).  

[Figure 3 about here]

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14 The exception is Australia, whose tax-and-spend policies reduce DINK discretionary time
by only a miniscule amount.

15 Australia for example runs its child-care subsidy through the tax system, as a rebate,
whereas in the US it takes the form of in-kind provision.
Figure 3: Impact of taxes, transfer payments and child-care subsidies on lone mothers' discretionary time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hours/week</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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What Figure 3 is telling us is, for example, that lone mothers in the US would on average have around 6 hours less discretionary time than Figure 1 shows they have at present were it not for the financial contributions they received through the state's tax-and-spend policies. With the conspicuous exception of Germany (just noted), that is broadly true across all the other countries under examination. The impact on lone-mother discretionary time is an hour less in France and Finland, an hour greater in Australia, half an hour greater in Sweden. But (except for Germany) states' financial contributions seem to increase lone mothers' discretionary time by around 6 hours a week.

ii. Setting the Terms of Divorce

The other big thing the state can do to affect the discretionary time of lone mothers is to dictate, or influence, the terms on which they divorce. How much discretionary time the lone mother has depends crucially upon how much help she gets from her ex-partner with the costs and the care of the children of their marriage.

Having children increases the amount of money that is necessary for a household to have to avoid poverty, and the amount of time that it is necessary for someone to spend earning it. Having children also increases the amount of time it is necessary to spend doing unpaid labour around the
household. That extra amount of 'necessary time' in each or both of those dimensions can either be shared among ex-partners upon divorce, or not.

In the results reported below, I calculate how much discretionary time, on average, a lone mother would have:

1) if she bore full financial and caring responsibilities for her children, with no assistance from her ex-partner (the 'no help' scenario);

2) if she bore full caring responsibilities for her children, but her ex-partner split the costs of the kids equally with her (the 'share costs' scenario); and

3) if both financial and caring responsibilities for the children were shared equally between ex-partners (the 'share costs and care' scenario).

In surmising the effects of imposing alternative divorce regimes, we start by selecting everyone in the surveys we are examining who is presently living as a couple with children in the household. We then ask how much discretionary time each of the partners would have, if they divorced in each of the alternative ways outlined above. So the same individuals, with the same wage rages, are involved in each of those 3 projections. The only thing that alters, moving from one to the next, is their necessary time in paid (or in 3, paid and unpaid) labour.

To keep the presentation simple, let us focus on just 2 of the countries I have been discussing: the US and Sweden, representing the 'most different' cases. The average discretionary time of lone mothers in each of those countries, under each of the above divorce scenarios, is shown in Figure 4.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4: Impact of alternative divorce rules on discretionary time of lone mothers

- US
- Sweden

- no help
- share costs
- share costs and care

Hours/week
Unsurprisingly, Figure 4 shows that lone mothers have least discretionary time when their ex-partner does not help at all with the kids, and that they have more discretionary time the more the ex-partner helps. Having her ex-partner share the costs of the kids gives the lone mother more discretionary time than if he did not help at all; and having her ex-partner share both the care and the costs of the kids gives the lone mother more discretionary time yet again. That is true in both countries (and all others), but the magnitudes of the effects differ between countries.

The big difference between the US and Sweden comes in what it is worth to the lone mother for her ex-partner share the costs of the kids. That gives the lone mother over 11 hours more discretionary time a week in the US than she would have had if he had not helped at all. That compares to just over 4 hours more in Sweden.

The gain in discretionary time that comes with having her ex-partner share the care as well as just the costs of the kids is pretty similar in both countries: that gives the lone mother on average about 5 hours more discretionary time in both the US and Sweden (and all the other countries under study).

The thing to note is just this. Either of those changes in the divorce regime alone would provide lone mothers with nearly as much (in the case of sharing the costs of kids in the US, far more) gain in discretionary time than do most generous states' financial contributions. Both those changes together would nearly (in the US, far more than) double that.
Realistically, it is easier to see how divorce law might impose the 'equal sharing of costs of kids' rule than the 'equal sharing of care of kids'. The latter may have to be left as a social norm, extra-legally enforced.

Still, if we can somehow bring about a state of affairs such that divorcing parents share equally both the costs and care of children, that would increase the discretionary time of lone mothers enormously, compared to what it would have been if they had to bear the financial and caring responsibilities for the kids alone. Sharing costs-and-care would give lone mothers over 9 hours more discretionary time a week in Sweden, and fully 16 in the US. That would eclipse the 6 hours a week that the state's financial contributions buy lone mothers.

iii. Other Things Government Can Do

Those are the sorts of effects of government intervention that we can pick up using the data and methodology available to us. It should be observed, however, that there are big differences between countries – particularly in the total discretionary time available to the worst-off (lone mothers) – that simply must be taken as pre-analytic givens for purposes of this study. Many of those differences are quite likely the product of government interventions; they are simply ones that lie outside the scope of the data and methodology we are using.
We have seen from Figure 1 that lone mothers have fully 20 hours a week more discretionary time in Sweden than in the US, for example. But we know from Figure 3 that government taxes, transfer payments and childcare subsidies have about the same impact on lone mothers in both places, increasing their discretionary time just over 6 hours a week. So where does the 20-hour difference come from?

It is not from any differences in the amount of time that it is necessary for lone mothers to spend in unpaid household labour or in personal care in those two countries. Those, by our calculations, are almost identical in both countries. Instead, the difference is almost wholly attributable to the differing amounts of time it is necessary for lone mothers in those two countries to work in paid labour in order to earn a poverty-level income.

Part of that difference is attributable to differing divorce rules and practices in the two countries. The average lone mother gets rather more money from her ex-partner in Sweden than in the US. Such 'private transfers' take the average Swedish lone mother more than 13% of the way to the poverty line, whereas they take the average US lone mother less than 9% of the way. By reducing the amount of money the lone mother needs to earn in paid labour to get above the poverty line, such private transfers reduce the amount of time she needs to spend in paid labour; and that in turn increases her discretionary time. And that effect is, as I say, somewhat larger in Sweden than the US.
A larger part of the story, however, is the relatively higher wage rates of lone mothers in Sweden compared to the US. The higher your wage rate, the less time you need to spend in paid labour to get any given (e.g., poverty-line) amount of money. And the less time that is necessary for you to spend in paid labour, the more 'discretionary time' you have, other things being equal.

In Sweden, the mean wage rate of lone mothers is 87% of the national mean for all prime-aged workers; in the US, it is 66%. Wage compression in Sweden has many sources, of course. But the policies of a long succession of social democratic governments have surely contributed something to wage equality. Yet that effect of government policy lies beyond the capacity of our study to calibrate.

D. Summing Up

Let me now try to pull these strands together. The conclusions I draw from this empirical research are:

• Discretionary time is a crucial resource and of central social justice concern.
• The distribution of discretionary time is very unequal, with the most temporally privileged (childless women in dual-earner couples) enjoying 26 to 42 hours a week more discretionary time than the most temporally underprivileged (lone mothers).
• It would be more unequal still if it were not for the state's financial interventions (taking 2 hours a week from the privileged group, and giving 6 hours a week to the underprivileged one).

• A potentially even larger contribution the state could make to equalizing the discretionary time of these two groups could come with changes to divorce regimes, inducing ex-husbands to share the costs and care of the children of their former marriages.

• A final contribution – unmeasurable within our methodology, but potentially even larger yet again – is policy designed to raise the wage rates of the worse off (lone mothers especially).

IV. Biting the Luck Egalitarian Bullet

One obvious reply to the arguments above for helping single parents is the luck-egalitarian reply. It's not (certainly not always, probably not usually) just plain bad luck that people have children. They (often, probably usually) chose to conceive them, or anyway did not take due precautions against conceiving them if they did not want them; they chose not to abort them once conceived, and not to give them up for adoption once born. Likewise with divorce. It's not (certainly not always, probably not usually) just plain bad luck that parents divorce. They (often, probably usually) chose to divorce, or anyway did not take due precautions to avoid their relationship deteriorating to the point divorce was inevitable. Insofar as lone parents are to a
substantial degree responsible in those ways for being parents without partners (and most, if by no means all, probably are), luck-egalitarians might insist that they have no just claim to social assistance with the consequences of their being lone parents. Insofar as they have only themselves to blame, they have no claim on the rest of us for assistance.

Of course, you can always ask just how many lone parents have done just how much to deserve their plight. Some of them did not do anything wrong. Many of them might have done something wrong, but whatever slight wrong they did is out of all proportion to the hardships they are bearing in consequence. All that is true, and important.

I want to pursue another tack, however. Is having children really 'wrong'? Is it something for which people should justly be expected to bear hardships? Or is it something that is good for society, and hence something that ought be socially rewarded and supported? I suggest the latter.

Luck egalitarianism is, I submit, misspecified when it is understood as saying 'if they are responsible for ø, they should suffer the natural consequences of ø'. It is not the 'natural consequences' but rather the 'just consequences' that they should experience.

Consider this analogy. Imagine a country in which intellectual property law were set up in such a way as to punish new inventors rather than reward them. (A cynic may say that is not far from the world we inhabit.) In that country, the 'natural consequences' of making some socially useful new invention would indeed be to be punished for it. Do luck-
egalitarians really want to say, in such a case: 'tough, she is responsible for
the invention, so she should the natural consequences which here are ten
years imprisonment'? If so, I would regard that as a reductio of luck-
egalitarianism. But surely what we should say, and what I assume a sensible
luck-egalitarian would want to say, is that we ought change the law so that it
rewards rather than punishes inventors. In this economistic day and age, that
argument would of course be couched in terms of 'getting the incentive
structure right'. But it is not just a matter of economistic tweaking of
incentives. We should do that also, I should have thought, as a matter of
justice. Inventors do something good for us; we should do something good
for them, or at least not make them suffer for the good that they do us. Ditto
parents.

Even if having kids is good, divorcing when you have kids might be
bad – a wrong for which luck-egalitarians might reasonably deem lone
parents to deserve to suffer hardships. But raising good kids is a social good,
too. There are of course many determinants of how kids turn out. But the
resources – time and money – that their parents have available in raising
them is one important determinant. So even if luck-egalitarians think that it
would be just for the parents to suffer for divorcing, it would not be in the
social interest for the children also to suffer. More to the present point, it
would not be just: whatever the sins of their parents in divorcing, the kids
have not done anything wrong.
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Â Distributive justice is ordinarily calibrated in monetary terms. But money is not the only resource that matters to people. Talk of the â€” workâ€”life balanceâ€”points to another: time. Control over one's time, the capacity to spend it as one wishes, is another important resource; and its distribution raises another important aspect of justice. Temporal Jurisdiction of the national courts. Under international law the date on which the ICC Statute becomes binding on a State Party is: 1st July 2002, or. The 60 day rule. If the ratification or accession is after 1st May 2002, then the first day of the month after the 60th day following the deposit by the State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (See Article 126(2)). Transformative justice is a series of practices and philosophies designed to create change in social systems. Mostly, they are alternatives to criminal justice in cases of interpersonal violence, or are used for dealing with socioeconomic issues in societies transitioning away from conflict or repression. Other fields of practice have adopted transformative justice, including to address groups' work on other social issues and climate justice. Temporal Jurisdiction Definition: Jurisdiction of a state or of a court of law over a legal action as it may be affected by the effects or passage of time.Â This, temporal jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction usually of a court of law over a proposed action in relation to the passage of time; either the court has lost temporal jurisdiction because the deadline for litigation of the particular action has expired, or it has temporal jurisdiction because it was launched within the prescribed time limitations.